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ILLEGITIMATE  OVERPRESCRIPTION:
HOW BURRAGE  V.  UNITED  STATES  IS  HINDERING
PUNISHMENT  OF  PHYSICIANS  AND
BOLSTERING  THE  OPIOID  EPIDEMIC
Alyssa M. McClure*
INTRODUCTION
When physicians enter the practice of medicine, they swear to follow the
principle: “First, do no harm.”1  In 2006, Dr. Dewey MacKay of Utah pre-
scribed prescription opioid medication to patient David Wirick, killing him.
In 2013, a jury convicted him of two counts of distributing Schedule II and III
controlled substances, the use of which resulted in death.2  The district court
sentenced Dr. MacKay to 240 months of incarceration,3 based on the penalty
enhancement for distributing controlled substances resulting in death under
the federal drug trafficking statute.4
Dr. MacKay’s conduct “went far beyond a ‘bad doctor’ standard of
care”5: he chronically overscheduled patients, “sometimes seeing 100
patients in [fewer] than eight hours”; conducted no or limited physical
examinations of his patients, “with entire [office] visits lasting between two to
five minutes”; repeatedly refilled prescriptions early; and “reflexive[ly]” pre-
scribed controlled substances without considering alternative methods of
treatment.6  In total, Dr. MacKay was convicted of thirty-seven counts of
unlawful distribution of Schedule II and III controlled substances.7
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
Psychology and Social Science Interdisciplinary, Concentration in Legal Studies, University
at Buffalo, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Stephen F. Smith for his advisement and
my family for their constant love and support.  I would also like to thank my Notre Dame
Law Review colleagues for their revisions.
1 United States v. Volkman, 736 F.3d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 135 S. Ct. 13 (2014).
2 United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 2013).
3 United States v. MacKay, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1291 (D. Utah 2014).
4 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).
5 Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians
Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 7,
46 (2016).
6 Id.
7 MacKay, 715 F.3d at 813.
1747
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL414.txt unknown Seq: 2  6-JUN-18 13:58
1748 notre dame law review [vol. 93:4
His story is not unique.  Dr. Paul Volkman ran a pain clinic in Ohio,
where he was convicted of four counts of unlawful distribution of a con-
trolled substance leading to death after four of his patients died of opioid
overdoses due to prescriptions he wrote.8  In fact, from 2003 to 2005, Dr.
Volkman dispensed more oxycodone than any other physician in the coun-
try.9  Dr. Stephen Schneider and his wife, nurse Linda Schneider, ran a pain
management treatment facility in Kansas, at which, over the course of six
years, sixty-eight of their patients died of drug overdoses.10  Just last Novem-
ber, a grand jury in the Western District of New York returned a 166-count
indictment against pain management doctor Eugene Gosy.11  One hundred
forty-four counts accused him of “unlawfully distributing and dispensing con-
trolled substances[ ] other than for a legitimate medical purpose and not in
the usual course of professional practice,” and a separate count alleged that
this conduct resulted in the death of six patients.12
As the opioid epidemic in the United States surges, death resulting from
physician prescription of controlled substances is becoming more common.
With it, criminal prosecution of physicians has increased; the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) has reported “a steady rise in successful criminal
prosecutions of physicians, from just 15 convictions in 2003 to 43 in 2008.”13
In pursuing these cases, prosecutors utilize 21 U.S.C. § 841.  Section 841(b)
contains a penalty enhancement for cases where distribution of controlled
substance(s) in violation of section 841(a) results in death or serious injury.14
Under this enhancement, the statutory minimum incarceration period is
twenty years.15  Prior to 2014, the causation standard a prosecutor was
required to prove to apply this increased penalty enhancement varied across
jurisdictions.  Some courts held that a contributing-factor standard was
appropriate,16 while others held that a showing of proximate cause was nec-
8 United States v. Volkman, 736 F.3d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 135 S. Ct. 13 (2014).
9 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of Ohio, Jury Convicts Physician
of Illegally Prescribing Pills that Led to Deaths of Four People (May 10, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/usao/ohs/news/05-10-11.html; see also Dineen & DuBois, supra
note 5, at 44–45.
10 United States v. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1203 (D. Kan. 2015).
11 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of N.Y., Federal Grand Jury
Returns 166 Count Superseding Indictment Against Local Doctor Whose Medical Practice
Is Charged with Unlawfully Prescribing Controlled Substances Resulting in the Death of
Six Patients (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/federal-grand-jury-
returns-166-count-superseding-indictment-against-local-doctor-whose.
12 Id.
13 Erica Trachtman, A Horrific Violation of Trust: Prosecuting Physicians for Patients’ Pre-
scription Overdoses, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.americancriminallawre
view.com/aclr-online/horrific-violation-trust-prosecuting-doctors-patients-prescription-
overdoses/.
14 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
15 Id.
16 Prior to Burrage v. United States, Eighth Circuit precedent required a contributing
cause finding to impose the statutory enhancement for death or serious bodily injury
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essary.17  Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Burrage v. United States, deter-
mined that the penalty enhancement under section 841(b) is not applicable
unless the defendant’s use of the controlled substance was a “but-for” cause
of the death or injury.18
Counts one and two in the case of Dr. MacKay alleged violations of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),19 triggering the potential application of this penalty
enhancement.  Post-Burrage, Dr. MacKay was resentenced.20  After declaring
the jury instructions insufficient in light of Burrage, the district court vacated
Dr. MacKay’s enhanced penalty convictions on counts one and two and
reduced his sentence from 240 to only thirty-six months.21  While the Court’s
decision in Burrage does not wholly prevent the prosecution of physicians for
misconduct or fully eliminate consequences for such behavior, it significantly
limits the penalties applicable in cases where physician misconduct results in
patient death.  Because physicians are subject to oversight by the medical
community and their patients may sue for malpractice, cases of prosecutorial
involvement generally indicate conduct so severe as to justify criminal conse-
quences. Burrage’s narrow interpretation of the language in section 841(b)
significantly increases prosecutors’ burden of proof.
Due to the concerns Burrage raises and its implications for the nation’s
current opioid crisis, this Note proposes that Congress should broaden the
circumstances in which the penalty enhancement of section 841(b) may be
applied.  Part I of this Note discusses the opioid crisis and the role physicians
play in it.  Part II explores the section of the Controlled Substances Act used
to criminally charge physicians and the exception the Act provides for physi-
cians prescribing opioids within the scope of relevant medical conduct and
professional practice.  Part III analyzes Burrage v. United States22 and examines
the immediate legal consequences of its holding, flagging issues that Bur-
rage’s approach creates in ensuring appropriate punishment for physician
violators.  Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative amendment that widens the
applicability of the twenty-year mandatory minimum penalty enhancement of
section 841(b) by broadening the language of the statute to allow for contrib-
uting factors.  Such a solution is not without concern, and several concerns
are addressed here, but the devastation of the opioid crisis must be met with
creative lawmaking.
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See United States v. Monnier, 412 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting a finding of reasonable foreseeability to impose the section 841 “death results”
enhancement, which in criminal law, equates to proximate cause), abrogated by Burrage v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing a
district court decision which required a proximate cause finding for a section 841(a)
conviction).
18 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887–88.
19 United States v. MacKay, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1290 (D. Utah 2014).
20 Id. at 1287.
21 Id. at 1295, 1299.
22 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).
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I. THE OPIOID CRISIS
On October 26, 2017, President Donald Trump declared the United
States opioid crisis a national public health emergency.23  The President’s
Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis released
an interim report24 in July 2017, which acknowledged the dire state of the
epidemic in the United States:
[H]ere is the grim reality: Americans consume more opioids than any other
country in the world.  In fact, in 2015, the amount of opioids prescribed in
the U.S. was enough for every American to be medicated around the clock
for three weeks. . . .
We have an enormous problem that is often not beginning on street cor-
ners; it is starting in doctor’s offices and hospitals in every state in our
nation.25
Opioids are “[n]atural or synthetic chemicals that interact with opioid
receptors on nerve cells in the body and brain, and reduce the intensity of
pain signals and feelings of pain.”26  Prescription opioids are prescribed by a
physician to treat moderate-to-severe pain27 and include drugs such as mor-
phine, codeine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, oxymorphone,
methadone, tramadol, and fentanyl.28  According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”), nearly half of all opioid overdose deaths
23 Dan Merica, Trump Declares Opioid Epidemic a National Public Health Emergency, CNN
(Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/donald-trump-opioid-epi-
demic/index.html.  Declaring the opioid crisis a national public health emergency
increases the amount of aid the federal government can give states to help combat the
epidemic, see Gregory Korte, Trump Orders Public Health Emergency for Opioids, a Partial Mea-
sure to Fight Drug Epidemic, USA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2017/10/26/exclusive-trump-declare-public-health-emergency-opioid-crisis-
partial-measure-figh/796797001/, but President Trump has yet to release that additional
funding. See, e.g., Maya Salam, The Opioid Epidemic: A Crisis Years in the Making, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/opioid-crisis-public-health-
emergency.html; Darlene Superville, White House: True Cost of Opioid Epidemic Tops $500
Billion, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/343477b5115748fc8
4924a78292921da/White-House:-True-cost-of-opioid-epidemic-tops-$500-billion (noting
that in its final report published in November 2017, the Commission “did not call for new
money to address the epidemic”).
24 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON COMBATTING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS,
INTERIM REPORT 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
ondcp/commission-interim-report.pdf.
25 Id.; see also Julie Bosman, Inside a Killer Drug Epidemic: A Look at America’s Opioid
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/opioid-crisis-
epidemic.html?mcubz=1 (calling opioid addiction “America’s 50-state epidemic”).
26 Opioid Overdose: Commonly Used Terms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/terms.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2017).
27 See Opioid Overdose: Prescription Opioids, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/prescribed.html (last updated Aug. 29,
2017).
28 Opioid Overdose: Commonly Used Terms, supra note 26.
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involve a prescription opioid, and in 2013, providers wrote nearly
250,000,000 opioid prescriptions—enough for every adult in the United
States to have his “own bottle of pills.”29
The current epidemic arose from opioid overuse in the United States.
This overuse stemmed from assurances by pharmaceutical companies to the
medical community in the late 1990s that patients would not become
addicted to prescription opioid painkillers.30  From 1999 to 2010, “[t]he
amount of prescription opioids sold to pharmacies, hospitals, and doctors’
offices nearly quadrupled,” yet there was no overall change in the level of
pain patients reported.31  Providers prescribed such pain medication in con-
sistently larger quantities and doses, which led to “widespread diversion and
misuse of these medications” before it became clear that these drugs are in
fact highly addictive.32  From 1999 to 2016, more than 200,000 people in the
United States died from prescription opioid-related overdoses.33
Public health officials have deemed the opioid epidemic “the worst drug
crisis in American history.”34  Deaths from prescription opioids “have more
than quadrupled since 1999.”35  In 2015, more than 15,000 people died from
overdoses involving prescription opioids.36  In 2016, opioid overdoses killed
more people than did guns or car accidents, and “at a pace faster than the
H.I.V. epidemic did at its peak.”37  As of November 2017, the CDC estimated
that in 2016, more than 64,000 people died of drug overdoses,38 compared
to just over 52,000 in 2015—the largest annual jump ever recorded in the
United States.39  And “there’s no sign it’s letting up.”40  Current trends indi-
29 Opioid Overdose: Prescription Opioids, supra note 27; Opioid Overdose: Prescription Opioid
Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugover
dose/data/overdose.html (last updated Aug. 1, 2017).
30 Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/
drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-crisis#one (last visited Apr. 5, 2018).
31 Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last updated Aug. 30,
2017).
32 Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 30.
33 Opioid Overdose: Prescription Opioid Overdose Data, supra note 29.
34 Bosman, supra note 25.
35 Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 31.
36 Opioid Overdose: Opioid Data Analysis, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2017).
37 Salam, supra note 23.
38 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PRO-
VISIONAL DRUG OVERDOSE DEATH COUNTS (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/
drug-overdose-data.htm.
39 Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-
overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html.
40 Bosman, supra note 25.
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cate that as many as 650,000 people will die over the next decade from opioid
overdoses—nearly as many people in ten years as HIV/AIDS killed in forty.41
Prescription opioid abuse remains one of the leading causes of opioid
death,42 as the vast majority of individuals abusing opioids obtain them from
a prescription—whether the prescription was written for them or for a family
member or friend.43  As far back as 1984, the Senate, in discussing amend-
ments to the Controlled Substances Act, noted that “[i]t is estimated that 80
to 90 percent of all current diversion occurs at [the practitioner] level.”44
Historically, the legal and academic professions have been reluctant to advo-
cate criminal liability for physicians for improper prescribing, “fearing that
such liability would create a chilling effect: physicians would refrain from
properly treating patients who legitimately needed certain prescription medi-
cations out of fear of criminal sanctions if a patient died from an overdose.”45
But as the opioid epidemic proliferates, killing ninety Americans every day,46
the argument for protecting misprescribing physicians from criminal prose-
cution has become less persuasive.  This is not to say that all physicians pre-
scribing opioids are doing so unlawfully; in fact, it is likely that the majority
adhere to federally mandated protocol for prescription of such drugs.  Many
have expressed concerns about properly prescribing given the known risks of
opioid medication.47  Even a minority of reckless physicians, however, con-
tribute to the opioid crisis, especially when they are able to continue their
prescription practices for years without detection.
41 Max Blau, STAT Forecast: Opioids Could Kill Nearly 500,000 Americans in the Next Dec-
ade, STAT (June 27, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/27/opioid-deaths-fore-
cast/.
42 The use of street drugs like heroin and fentanyl has increased.  It is estimated that
in 2016, synthetic opioids, heroin, and prescription opioids were the top three causes of
overdose death, respectively. Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://
www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates (last visited Mar.
19, 2018).
43 Primary care physicians are responsible for roughly half of opioids dispensed.
About twenty-seven percent of opioid abusers obtain their opioids from their own prescrip-
tions, and as many as forty-nine percent of people obtain prescription opioids from a
friend or relative. Opioid Overdose: Prescribing Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html (last updated Aug. 30,
2017).
44 Douglas J. Behr, Prescription Drug Control Under the Federal Controlled Substances Act: A
Web of Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Law Controls, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
41, 44 (1994) (second alteration in original) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 261–62 (1984),
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3443–44).
45 Michael C. Barnes & Stacy L. Sklaver, Active Verification and Vigilance: A Method to
Avoid Civil and Criminal Liability When Prescribing Controlled Substances, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 93, 95 (2013).
46 Yousur Al-Hlou et al., The Facts on America’s Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES VIDEO (Oct.
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/video/health/policy/100000005515818/the-opioid-
epidemic-what-you-need-to-know.html.
47 See Opioid Overdose: Prescribing Data, supra note 43.
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II. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
A. Background and History
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), or Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,48 crafted a framework for federal con-
trol of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensation of controlled sub-
stances in the United States.49  The Act was implemented in response to a
growing drug problem in our nation50 and emerged from a lengthy legisla-
tive history, which focused on the prohibition of illegal drug manufacturing
and distribution.  In the years since, the Act has undergone several amend-
ments and is now codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904.
A controlled substance, as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 802(6), is “a drug or
other substance . . . included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V” of 21 U.S.C.
§ 812.51  Congress authorized the DEA, created in 1973 under the CSA, to
“schedule and regulate controlled substances.”52  Under the CSA, drugs are
divided into five schedules “based on their medical utility as well as the
potential for abuse, misuse, physical and psychological dependence.”53
Schedule I drugs are not currently accepted in treatment for any medical use
and are considered to have a “high potential for abuse,” but Schedules II, III,
IV, and V drugs have “accepted medical uses with the potential for abuse and
dependence ranging from high (Schedule II) to progressively less . . .
through Schedule V.”54  Most opioids are Schedule II drugs.55  Prescription
opioids include: hydrocodone (Vicodin, Lortab, Lorcet, Norco); oxycodone
(OxyContin, Percocet); oxymorphone (Opana); propoxyphene (Darvon);
hydromorphone (Dilaudid); meperidine (Demerol); diphenoxylate (Lomo-
til); morphine (Kadian, Avinza, MS Contin, Duramorph); codeine; fentanyl
(Duragesic); and methadone.56
48 Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242 (codified as amended in scattered
titles of the U.S. Code).
49 Id.; Behr, supra note 44, at 49.
50 Drug abuse first emerged as a problem in the United States in the 1870s and 1880s.
David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: How a “Big Tent” Reform Became a Punitive
Drug Law, 76 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 10 (2004).  Eventually, well-organized
international drug cartels began to infiltrate the United States.  By the early 1970s, drug
use in the United States had become “sufficiently serious to warrant” an organized
response. U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., THE DEA YEARS: 1970-1975, at 30, https://
www.dea.gov/about/history/1970-1975%20p%2030-39.pdf.
51 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2012).
52 Michael C. Barnes & Gretchen Arndt, The Best of Both Worlds: Applying Federal Com-
merce and State Police Powers to Reduce Prescription Drug Abuse, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
271, 281 (2013).
53 Dineen & DuBois, supra note 5, at 29; see 21 U.S.C. § 812(b).
54 Dineen & DuBois, supra note 5, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). See gener-
ally 21 U.S.C. § 812(b).
55 Dineen & DuBois, supra note 5, at 29.
56 Joanna Shepherd, Combating the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescription
Drug Reporting Program, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 87 (2014); see also Commonly Abused Drugs
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Section 841(a)(1) of the CSA states that “it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled sub-
stance.”57  Section 841(b) outlines the penalties for violating subsection
(a).58  Subparagraph (b)(1)(A) covers large quantities of heroin, cocaine,
PCP, LSD, fentanyl, marijuana, and methamphetamine.  In the case of such a
violation, “such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which
may not be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of such substance [the sentence] shall be not less
than 20 years or more than life.”59  Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily
injury which involves a substantial risk of death; protracted and obvious dis-
figurement; or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty.”60  If an individual is sentenced under this
subsection, probation or suspension of an individual’s sentence is not permit-
ted, and no individual convicted under this subsection may be placed on
parole.61  Subparagraph (b)(1)(B), which involves smaller drug quantities
than (b)(1)(A), also includes the “death results” penalty enhancement: if
death results from unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, the dis-
tributor is subject to a minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment.62  Subsec-
tion (b)(1)(C) governs instances of distribution of a controlled substance in
Schedule I or II, in which case the distributor will be sentenced to not more
than a twenty-year term of imprisonment except “if death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of such substance [the defendant] shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than
life.”63
As originally enacted, section 841 did not establish mandatory minimum
sentences and “prescribed no enhanced penalties relating to death or serious
bodily injury.”64  Generally, for Schedule I or II controlled substances, the
Act imposes sentences ranging from ten years to life imprisonment for large-
scale distributions,65 from five to forty years for medium-scale distributions,66
and not more than twenty years for smaller distributions.67  The Controlled
Charts: Prescription Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-
abuse/commonly-abused-drugs-charts (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
57 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
58 Id. § 841(b).
59 Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
60 Id. § 802(25).
61 Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
62 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
63 Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
64 Brief for the United States at 3, Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (No.
12-7515).
65 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
66 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
67 Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
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Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 198468 introduced the penalty
enhancements in the current version of section 841.  Consequently, these
sentence ranges do not apply when “death or serious bodily injury results
from the use of [the distributed] substance.”69  Instead, the defendant “shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which . . . shall be not less than 20
years or more than life,” a substantial fine, or both.70  Further, in 1986, Con-
gress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, “which redefined the offense catego-
ries, increased the maximum penalties and set minimum penalties for many
offenders, including the ‘death results’ enhancement.”71  While Congress
has amended section 841(b)(1) numerous times, it has not altered the
“death results” provision.72
The text of section 841 does not define what is required to apply the
“death results” enhancement.  Prior to Burrage, courts opined that Congress’s
use of the passive phrase “‘if death . . . results’ . . . unambiguously elimi-
nate[d] any statutory requirement that the death have been foreseeable”73
and that “the plain language of [section] 841(b)(1)(C) does not require, nor
does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the district
court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a
defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”74  The government argued in
Burrage that “[t]he text of Section 841(b)(1) makes clear that proximate
cause or foreseeability is not required.”75
B. The Physician Exception
Under the CSA, distribution of controlled substances may lawfully occur
only among registered handlers.76  Practitioners are excepted under the
CSA, and as such are permitted to “distribute, dispense, conduct research
with respect to [and] administer . . . a controlled substance” so long as such
conduct is done “in the course of professional practice.”77  A physician quali-
fies as a “practitioner.”78  The CSA requires individuals and companies who
“manufacture, handle, prescribe, or dispense” controlled substances to regis-
68 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. V, 98 Stat. 1837, 2068 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801–962).
69 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(C).
70 Id.
71 Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2014); see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.
Code).
72 Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 4.
73 United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (first alteration in
original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)).
74 United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994).
75 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 13, Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
881 (2014) (No. 12-7515).
76 Shepherd, supra note 56, at 103.
77 21 U.S.C. § 802(21).
78 Id.
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ter with the DEA.79  A practitioner “may register for any or all of the sched-
ules except Schedule I.”80  A controlled substance in Schedules II through V
used as a prescription drug may not be dispensed without a prescription.81
The medical profession, however, is not immune from criminal liability
under 21 U.S.C. § 841.82  While the text of the statute does not specifically
call out physicians, a “prescribing practitioner” accepts responsibility for the
“proper prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances” such as
opioids.83  To be lawful, a prescription for a controlled substance must be
issued “for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting
in the usual course of his professional practice.”84  Consequently, physicians
may be prosecuted for improperly prescribing controlled substances, despite
being licensed and registered to do so, when their conduct falls outside “the
usual course of professional practice.”85  The Supreme Court adopted this
standard in United States v. Moore, where a physician was found guilty of know-
ingly and unlawfully distributing the Schedule II controlled substance metha-
done, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), after prescribing medication “in
large quantities to patients at their requests, in the requested amount, and at
a price based on the number of pills.”86  However, Moore involved a physician
who shirked all professional responsibility and thus provides little guidance
on the definition of the “usual course of professional practice.”87  Further,
what qualifies as a legitimate medical purpose is not defined in the CSA,88
and “[t]here are no specific guidelines concerning what is required to sup-
port a conclusion that an accused acted outside the usual course of profes-
sional practice.”89  Instead, the “‘usual course of professional practice’ is an
objective standard.”90  The federal courts and the DEA have mostly inter-
preted “legitimate medical purpose” to require that the “dispensing [of] con-
trolled substances be done ‘in accordance with a standard of medical
practice recognized and accepted in the United States.’”91  However, “[a]
physician cannot argue that he alone can determine what constitutes proper
medical practice.”92  Courts have found physicians to be acting outside
79 Behr, supra note 44, at 49; 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)–(b).
80 Behr, supra note 44, at 54.
81 21 U.S.C. § 829.
82 See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
83 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017).
84 Id.
85 Moore, 423 U.S. at 124.
86 Barnes & Sklaver, supra note 45, at 122; see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 124–25; Diane E.
Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in
Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 274–75 (2008).
87 Barnes & Sklaver, supra note 45, at 122.
88 Jeffrey C. Grass, The Medicine Shoppe v. Loretta Lynch, et al.: Pharmacists and Pre-
scribing Physicians Are Equally Liable, 28 HEALTH LAW. 28, 28–29 (2016).
89 United States v. August, 984 F.2d 705, 713 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
90 Behr, supra note 44, at 113.
91 Grass, supra note 88, at 30 (quoting Moore, 423 U.S. at 139).
92 Behr, supra note 44, at 113.
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proper medical practice in a wide array of situations, including issuing pre-
scriptions without physically examining the patient, issuing specific prescrip-
tions at the patient’s request, and writing an excessive number of
prescriptions or writing prescriptions too frequently.93  The Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Rosenberg has held that the term “professional practice” is not
unconstitutionally vague, given the “ease and consistency with which courts
have interpreted” the language.94  Thus, “[a]ny distribution or dispensing by
a registrant that is not within his ‘professional practice’ is not authorized and
is therefore illegal.”95
To successfully prosecute a violating physician, the prosecution must
prove that the physician prescribed controlled substances “(1) knowingly; (2)
without a legitimate medical purpose; and (3) outside the course of profes-
sional practice.”96  A physician being prosecuted under the CSA “must either
have had ‘actual knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately failed to
inquire about it before taking action to support it.’”97  In fact, “[n]o allega-
tion of diversion or criminal intent is necessary for indictment; all that need
be alleged is that the act was knowing or intentional.”98
III. A CLEAR BUT HEIGHTENED STANDARD: BURRAGE V. UNITED STATES
A. Burrage v. United States
In 2014, the Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory mini-
mum penalty enhancement of section 841(b) applies when a drug supplied
by the defendant contributes to, but is not a but-for cause of, the victim’s
death or injury.99  In Burrage, longtime drug user Joshua Banka died of a
drug overdose.  A toxicology test revealed that he had heroin, codeine,
alprazolam, clonazepam, and oxycodone in his system.100  Marcus Burrage
sold Banka the heroin he ingested right before he died.  A grand jury for the
Southern District of Iowa returned a superseding indictment charging Bur-
rage with one count of unlawfully distributing heroin and one count of
unlawfully distributing heroin where death resulted, subjecting him to the
twenty-year mandatory minimum of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).101  Two medi-
93 See id. at 67–71 for further discussion of instances where courts have determined
that physicians were acting outside the scope of their relevant professional conduct.
94 United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1975).
95 Behr, supra note 44, at 67 (citing Moore, 423 U.S. at 138–43).
96 Dineen & DuBois, supra note 5, at 30; see 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017) (“[A] pre-
scription for a controlled substance . . . must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by
an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”).
97 Dineen & DuBois, supra note 5, at 30–31 (quoting United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d
1023, 1031 (8th Cir. 2006)).
98 Behr, supra note 44, at 54.
99 See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).
100 Id. at 885.
101 Id.  Section 841(b)(1)(C), which governs distribution of controlled substances in
Schedules I or II, applied because heroin is a Schedule I drug. Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG
ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml. (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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cal experts testified regarding the cause of Banka’s death.102  The first testi-
fied that multiple drugs were present at the time of death and that only the
heroin was above the therapeutic range; while the expert was not certain
whether Banka would have lived had he not taken the heroin, he neverthe-
less concluded that the heroin was a “contributing factor” to Banka’s
death.103  The second also testified that the heroin played a “‘contributing’
role” but could not say whether Banka would have lived had he not ingested
the heroin.104
At trial, the jury instructions stated that “the Government must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the heroin distributed by the Defendant was
a contributing cause of Joshua Banka’s death.  A contributing cause is a fac-
tor that, although not the primary cause, played a part in the death.”105  The
jury convicted Burrage on both counts, and the court sentenced him to two
concurrent twenty-year terms.106  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding
the district court’s contributing-cause jury instruction and ruling that a show-
ing of proximate cause was not required.107  On appeal by Burrage, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
At oral argument, the government argued that Congress’s “results in”
language reflected its intent “to borrow courts’ approaches to causation in
common law cases,” which emphasize that “if your test for causation, say a
but-for test, is producing a result in a case that nothing and nobody was the
cause of the victim’s death, you need to rethink your test for causation
[because i]t’s not producing sound results.”108  Justice Kagan, concerned
with maintaining a clear standard, expressed concern that the CSA “criminal-
izes a drug when it results in death.  And [the government] can’t say any-
thing about resulting in death except . . . by reference to probabilities and
likelihoods.”109  The Court ruled in favor of Burrage.  In overruling the
lower courts, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that because the
CSA does not define the phrase “results from” in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),
the Court must give it its ordinary meaning: “Where there is no textual or
contextual indication to the contrary, courts regularly read phrases like
‘results from’ to require but-for causality.”110  In so doing, the Court rejected
the imposition of the penalty enhancement when the drug merely “contrib-
utes to” death or serious bodily injury:
Congress could have written § 841(b)(1)(C) to impose a mandatory mini-
mum when the underlying crime “contributes to” death or serious bodily
102 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 885.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 886.
105 Brief of Appellee at 10, United States v. Burrage, 747 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2014) (No.
11-3602).
106 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 886; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 11.
107 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 886.
108 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 881 (No. 12-7515).
109 Id. at 42–43.
110 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887–88.
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injury, or adopted a modified causation test tailored to cases involving con-
current causes . . . . It chose instead to use language that imports but-for
causality. . . . [W]e cannot give the text a meaning that is different from its
ordinary, accepted meaning.111
The Court therefore adopted a but-for test in proving causality for pur-
poses of section 841(b) enhancement.  “[A] defendant’s conduct will qualify
as a but-for cause even if it ‘combines with other factors to produce the
result, so long as the other factors alone would not have done so—if, so to
speak, it was the straw that broke the camel’s back.’”112  The Court did
acknowledge that an exception to the but-for test might be warranted in
cases “where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is . . . an indepen-
dently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury.”113  By
“independently sufficient,” the Court appears to have meant “that the defen-
dant’s conduct must be sufficient in combination with background condi-
tions (like the state of Banka’s physical health, for example), as distinct from
other nonbackground conditions (like the other drugs in Banka’s sys-
tem).”114  The Court expressly rejected the government’s policy arguments,
writing that “[t]he role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—
even if we think some other approach might ‘accord with good policy.’ . . .
[And the statute] is written to require but-for cause.”115
B. Concerns About Physician Prosecution Raised Under Burrage
The Court’s interpretation of Burrage had immediate consequences for
prosecutors and those previously convicted under section 841, and continues
to affect prosecution under this section, particularly in light of the increasing
severity of the opioid epidemic.  Cases that applied the twenty-year penalty
enhancement of section 841(b) were eligible for retroactive review and appli-
cation of Burrage after the case was decided.  When Dr. MacKay’s case came
before the district court post-Burrage, the court noted: “[T]he Government
asks the Court to find the statutory interpretation skills of the common
layperson juror equal to those of Justice Scalia.”116  The court determined
that “[s]imply providing the jurors with the ‘resulting from’ language, with-
out more, is not acceptable.”117  This resulted in a significant reduction of
Dr. MacKay’s sentence.118  While by no means an exhaustive list, the follow-
111 Id. at 891 (citations omitted).
112 Eric A. Johnson, Cause-in-Fact After Burrage v. United States, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1727,
1738 (2016) (quoting Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 888).
113 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 892.
114 Johnson, supra note 112, at 1745 (emphasis omitted).
115 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 892 (citation omitted) (quoting Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S.
235, 252 (1996)).
116 United States v. MacKay, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1295 (D. Utah 2014).
117 Id.
118 Dr. MacKay’s sentence was reduced from 240 months to just thirty-six months. Id.
at 1299.
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ing concerns arise from Burrage’s application, specifically in the context of
physicians and the opioid crisis.
1. Unduly Decreasing Sentences: Fear That No One Is Being Held
Responsible for Patient Deaths in a But-For Cause Situation
The chief concern regarding Burrage’s role in the precedent governing
criminal prosecution of physicians is that Burrage will reduce sentences of
physician violators in a manner that detracts from the punishment that a
factfinder has determined the physician deserves.  While a jury simply deter-
mines guilt or innocence and does not sentence a violator, its determinations
at the trial stage inform the judge’s decision at sentencing. Burrage’s strict
but-for test does not allow for contributing factors to result in penalty
enhancement, but instead establishes a more stringent but-for standard.  This
in effect permits lower sentences where facts demonstrate that a doctor’s con-
duct contributed to a patient’s death, but where but-for causation cannot be
medically proven.  A but-for test applied to cases like Burrage “would lead to
the conclusion that nothing and nobody caused the victim to die.”119
This concern is most clearly evidenced in cases in which a retroactive
application of Burrage significantly decreases the offending physician’s term
of imprisonment.  Dr. MacKay was sentenced to 240 months’ incarceration
for his conduct in violation of section 841(a)(1).120  A jury convicted Dr.
MacKay based on the testimony of his egregious conduct, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit, on appeal, determined that the jury instructions were permissible—that
a reasonable juror could determine that both the oxycodone and the
hydrocodone in patient Wirick’s system, by themselves, resulted in his
death.121  Yet, post-Burrage, the District of Utah ruled that the jury instruc-
tions were insufficient such that Dr. MacKay’s enhanced penalty convictions
on counts one and two were vacated,122 and his sentence was reduced from
240 to only thirty-six months.123
Similarly, when the District of Kansas reviewed the case of Dr. Stephen
Schneider and his wife Linda post-Burrage, Dr. Schneider’s convictions for
counts of distribution where “death results” were eliminated.  Of the sixty-
eight of Dr. Schneider’s patients who died of drug overdoses in a six-year
period, the government was able to charge only four under the “death
results” language of section 841.124  A jury convicted the Schneiders of three
119 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 46; see also Brief of Amici Curiae
States of Alaska et al. Supporting Respondent at 4, Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 881 (No. 12-7515)
(“In cases like Burrage’s . . . application of the but-for test would lead to the absurd conclu-
sion that the result ‘may not have any “cause” at all.’” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality opinion))).
120 MacKay, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1291; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
121 United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 830 (10th Cir. 2013).
122 MacKay, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1295.
123 Id. at 1299.
124 United States v. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1202–03 (D. Kan. 2015).
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of the death counts.125  The district court declined to apply the twenty-year
mandatory minimum sentence for each of the resulting deaths, but sen-
tenced Stephen and Linda to thirty and thirty-three years of incarceration,
respectively.126  The appellate court affirmed both convictions and
sentences.127  Post-Burrage, however, the Schneiders’ convictions on counts
two, three, five, and seven through nine were vacated, and the sentence of
count one was also vacated.128  Counts two and three were two of the three
“death results” counts; count four was the third count, which was allowed
post-Burrage due to harmless error;129 and count five charged that the
Schneiders’ illegal dispensing of controlled substances resulted in the serious
injury or death of eighteen named patients.130  Notwithstanding the sixty-
eight patients who died, over 100 of Dr. Schneider’s patients were admitted
to local hospitals for overdoses during that six-year period,131 but post-Bur-
rage, the Schneiders’ sentences were significantly reduced.
Even the remand of Burrage itself demonstrates the reduction in sen-
tencing that its holding caused.  While Burrage was sentenced to twenty
years’ imprisonment, consistent with section 841(b)(1)(C)’s prescribed mini-
mum, on remand, the Eighth Circuit reversed Burrage’s conviction on the
“death results” count and remanded for resentencing.132  Critics would
counter that preventing the application of the penalty enhancement does
not equate to not punishing the violator at all, as he will still be subject to
penalties under sections 841(a) and 841(b).  In fact, Burrage’s counsel said
as much at oral argument, arguing that “the concerns about letting defend-
ants go free . . . simply doesn’t [sic] play a part in this analysis.  Every criminal
defendant in any of these hypotheticals would have some sort of criminal
liability, either a lesser included offense[,] . . . accomplice liability[,] . . .
conspiracy[,] . . . [or] attempt.”133  However, this argument does not encom-
pass the unique relationship between a physician and his patient.  The point
of the penalty enhancement is to more severely punish conduct that results
in the loss of life.  The circuits have opined on this.  For example, the Eighth
Circuit noted that “[f]rom the statute’s language, it is clear Congress
intended to expose a defendant to a more severe minimum sentence when-
ever death or serious injury is a consequence of the victim’s use of a con-
125 Id. at 1215.
126 United States v. Schneider, No. 07-10234-01, 02, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111968, at
*21 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2010).
127 United States v. Schneider, 704 F.3d 1287, 1297 (10th Cir. 2013).
128 Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 1223.
129 Id. at 1211–15.
130 Id. at 1204.
131 Id. at 1203.
132 United States v. Burrage, 747 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2014).
133 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 56.
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trolled substance that has been manufactured or distributed by that
defendant.”134  The Fourth Circuit too wrote:
The statute puts drug dealers and users on clear notice that their sentences
will be enhanced if people die from using the drugs they distribute.  Where
serious bodily injury or death results from the distribution of certain drugs,
Congress has elected to enhance a defendant’s sentence regardless of
whether the defendant knew or should have known that death would result.
We will not second-guess this unequivocal choice.135
This intent is of particular importance in a situation where a patient is
trusting his physician to provide competent medical advice and treatment
that is in his best interest.
Burrage did not present the Court with evidence that the heroin distrib-
uted by the defendant was independently sufficient to produce Banka’s
death.  Similarly, many post-Burrage “death results” penalty enhancement
cases have not provided an opportunity to opine on this “because they have
not involved any debate over but-for causation and have not included clear
testimony that the drugs distributed by the defendant were independently
sufficient to produce the harm at issue.”136  Oral argument in Burrage
revealed the Court’s concern with situations where an individual who dies
from ingesting controlled substances received multiple drugs from multiple
sources.137  However, one could easily envision a scenario in which a patient
dies from ingesting multiple controlled substances, all of which were pre-
scribed in an illegitimate manner by the same doctor.  Often in the physician-
patient death context, the patient is taking several medications that have
been prescribed by the same physician.  This is called polypharmacy.138  The
Court’s analysis did not consider such a scenario.
Even in cases where post-Burrage application of the twenty-year penalty
enhancement of section 841(b) was upheld, it can be argued that a but-for
standard is unnecessary.  In United States v. Smith, for example, the Eastern
District of Kentucky applied Burrage “to uphold a ‘results from’ penalty
enhancement based on an oxycodone overdose.”139  When a toxicology test
revealed that decedent Patty Smallwood “had more than four times the maxi-
mum therapeutic level of oxycodone in her system,” a jury convicted distribu-
tor Terry Smith of distributing oxycodone resulting in death in violation of
134 United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted),
abrogated by Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014); see also United States v. Mon-
nier, 412 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2005), abrogated by Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 881.
135 United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted) (cita-
tion omitted).
136 Criminal Law—Controlled Substances Act—District Court Denies Oxycodone Distributor’s
Post-Trial Motions in Penalty-Enhancement Case.—United States v. Smith, No. 6:13-34-KKC,
2015 WL 4458891 (E.D. Ky. July 21, 2015), Recent Case, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2297, 2301–02
(2016) [hereinafter District Court Denies Oxycodone Distributor’s Post-Trial Motions].
137 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108.
138 Danielle M. Nunziato, Note, Preventing Prescription Drug Overdose in the Twenty-First
Century: Is the Controlled Substances Act Enough?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1270 n.65 (2010).
139 District Court Denies Oxycodone Distributor’s Post-Trial Motions, supra note 136, at 2297.
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21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).140  Medical experts opined that Smallwood would
have died from the oxycodone use alone.141  While the evidence indicated
Smallwood had more than twice the lethal level of oxycodone in her system,
the court still had to “dismiss the causal significance of therapeutic amounts
of alprazolam and hydrocodone—which generally must be taken in doses
multiple times their recommended maximums in order to be lethal—as well
as THC—which, for practical purposes, cannot be taken in lethal doses” to
satisfy the but-for standard of Burrage.142  If the enhancement did not require
but-for causation, the parties could have “focus[ed] on the lethal level of
oxycodone in Smallwood’s system” instead of working to deemphasize the
“benign effects of the other drugs.”143  “[I]n cases where the evidence and
expert testimony make clear that a particular drug is independently suffi-
cient, an interpretation not requiring but-for causation can simplify the
court’s inquiry.”144
2. Heightening the Prosecutorial Burden
The Burrage standard heightens the prosecutorial burden of prosecuting
violators under sections 841(a) and 841(b) when the twenty-year penalty
enhancement is applicable.  The burden of proving the physician’s criminal
conduct to a jury is already great: 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) states that the bur-
den of going forward with evidence of “any exemption or exception set forth
. . . in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading or in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding . . . shall be upon the person claiming its
benefit.”145  The Ninth Circuit has held that, in cases like those at issue here,
this provision requires the practitioner to present evidence that he is a “prac-
titioner,” but that “[o]nce such evidence has been produced, the burden
shifts to the government to prove that the prescriptions were not issued in
the usual course of medical practice.”146
As previously discussed, the government must prove that the physician-
defendant (1) “distributed or dispensed a controlled substance”; (2) “acted
knowingly and intentionally”; and (3) did so for an illegitimate medical pur-
pose and outside “the usual course of his professional practice.”147  That
“prescriptions [for controlled substances] issued by a physician were not
issued in the usual course of medical practice for a legitimate medical rea-
son” is the element most often at issue in a physician prosecution.148  While
140 United States v. Smith, No. 6:13-34, 2015 WL 4458891, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. July 21,
2015).
141 District Court Denies Oxycodone Distributor’s Post-Trial Motions, supra note 136, at 2302.
142 Id. at 2303–04 (footnotes omitted).
143 Id. at 2304.
144 Id. at 2303.
145 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) (2012).
146 Behr, supra note 44, at 93; see, e.g., United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir.
1975).
147 See Behr, supra note 44, at 96–97.
148 Id.
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courts accept knowledge as the appropriate mens rea for this element of act-
ing outside the boundaries of medical practice, they are split in interpreting
this requirement: some ask whether the doctor acted in “good faith,” and
others “allow willful blindness to indicate that the doctor was prescribing to
drug users and dealers to fulfill the knowledge element.”149
The Schneider court itself noted that Burrage heightened the prosecu-
tion’s burden: “The Burrage decision imposes a ‘new and stricter burden of
proof that the government needs to prove in order to establish that “death
resulted” from drug distribution.’”150  Heightening the prosecutorial burden
in this manner is unnecessary given the discretion prosecutors have in select-
ing which cases they will pursue, the counts included in an indictment, and
the ability to request or advocate for a specific penalty, whether or not it be
the twenty-year penalty enhancement of section 841(b).  The doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion has long been ingrained in our legal jurispru-
dence.151  “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, gener-
ally rests entirely in his discretion.”152  Further, the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that “when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the
Government may prosecute under either” so long as its actions are not dis-
criminatory in nature.153  If the standard under Burrage is lessened,
prosecutorial discretion will check the ethical prosecutor from bringing
claims against physicians that cannot be proved with admissible evidence.
3. The Greater Impact of Policy Concerns in the Context of the Current
Opioid Crisis
The Court in Burrage dismissed the government’s argument that the
ordinary meaning of “results from” would run contrary to public policy,
instead touting “the need for clarity and certainty in the criminal law.”154  It
is not disputed that there is a need for certainty in the criminal law.  How-
ever, the government’s objection that the ordinary meaning of “results in,”
which led the Court to impart a but-for causation standard, will “unduly
limit[ ] criminal responsibility” is persuasive.155  Section 841 was initially
149 See Deborah Hellman, Pushing Drugs or Pushing the Envelope: The Prosecution of Doctors
in Connection with Over-Prescribing of Opium-Based Drugs, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 7, 8–9
(2008) (emphasis omitted).  Jury instructions vary across jurisdictions on this point.
150 United States v. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1209 (D. Kan. 2015) (quoting
Weldon v. United States, No. 14-0691, 2015 WL 1806253, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015),
vacated, 840 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2016)).
151 See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and
Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
152 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
153 Krauss, supra note 151, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979)).
154 Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 891 (2014).
155 Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 24.
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drafted in 1970 and was significantly amended in 1984—before the opioid
epidemic began.  The “death results” language was added prior to the opioid
epidemic and the start of the growing trend of criminally prosecuting physi-
cians.  It was not—and still is not—Congress’s intent in drafting or amending
the CSA to prosecute physicians who are conducting themselves in the course
of a legitimate medical purpose and within the scope of professional con-
duct.  Congress intends to use section 841 to prosecute individuals—physi-
cians or otherwise—who distribute controlled substances outside recognized
CSA exceptions.
When the Court decided Burrage in 2014, the opioid crisis had not
peaked in the way it has in the years since.  The increasing rate of prescrip-
tion opioid deaths should be considered in analyzing Burrage as the gov-
erning standard.  As the government noted in its brief in Burrage, “[t]he text
and structure of the CSA, as well as the context in which the ‘death results’
provision was enacted, indicate that the primary concern of the ‘death
results’ provision is drug overdoses.”156  There is a significant public health
concern that criminally prosecuting physicians—and making it easier for
prosecutors to meet the burden to apply the penalty enhancement of section
841(b)—will limit or remove access to prescription pain medication for indi-
viduals who need it and cause doctors to become leery of prescribing pre-
scription opioids.  As another commentator observed, “[i]t is true that
prescription drugs and/or controlled substances, when prescribed for a legit-
imate medical purpose and in the course of ordinary patient care, do effec-
tively manage and treat severe pain, which improves the quality of life for
many patients.”157  It is possible that physicians, fearing criminal liability, may
undertreat their patients’ pain by prescribing fewer controlled substances,
which may prolong the patients’ pain and suffering.158  Amending section
841, however, will not force physicians who are prescribing within the course
of relevant medical conduct to stop doing so.  Such an amendment is geared
toward punishing misprescribing physicians: those who “fail to attend to basic
procedural requirements for competent and careful practice,”159 as well as
those who are corrupt and acting with criminal intent.  It is thus possible to
prosecute only physicians who unlawfully abuse their prescription power and
allow doctors to continue prescribing approved controlled substances to
those patients who truly need them for quality of life.
Additionally, there are numerous stopgaps to physician misconduct
before resorting to criminal prosecution.  The CSA lays out strict guidelines
that physicians must follow to be eligible to prescribe opioids, including
“duties regarding receiving and maintaining records of controlled sub-
stances, writing . . . prescriptions, providing refills, transferring a controlled
156 Id. at 14.
157 Nunziato, supra note 138, at 1270.
158 See Jacob B. Nist, Commentary, Liability for Overprescription of Controlled Substances:
Can It Be Justified in Light of the Current Practice of Undertreating Pain?, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 85,
85, 87–88 (2002).
159 Dineen & DuBois, supra note 5, at 40.
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substance to another registered prescriber, [properly storing] controlled sub-
stances, and reporting . . . theft or significant loss of [such medication].”160
Doctors must continue to adhere to these regulations.  Physicians are also
subject to oversight by their medical boards and may be the target of medical
malpractice suits in the civil realm.  If a physician is found to be acting in
violation of the CSA or an equivalent state statute, state medical boards typi-
cally suspend the physician’s medical license or place the offending physician
on probation.161  The DEA may elect to prosecute a violating practitioner
under state law or federally under the CSA.162  Thus, a physician facing fed-
eral criminal prosecution has most likely thwarted these other stopgaps, and
his conduct, in most instances, is sufficiently egregious to justify turning to
the criminal justice system.
IV. AMENDING 21 U.S.C. § 841: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION
The concerns raised in Section III.B do not provide one perfect solu-
tion.  But the most practical solution to the heightened standard established
in Burrage is a congressional amendment of the language of section 841 to
better reflect Congress’s intent in drafting it.  An amendment from Congress
altering this statutory language will not cause mass uncertainty in the law.  In
fact, “[n]o one looking at [the CSA] in its current form should assume that
its framers anticipated that it would operate in such an inflexible way, or
serve such punitive ends.”163
An amendment from Congress should include language that would per-
mit a contributing-cause analysis.  “[A]sking whether a particular act was a
contributing cause of a given result is a sound, accepted, and comprehensive
test for causation in fact.”164  In polypharmic cases, where the patient is tak-
ing several medications prescribed by the same physician, the causation prob-
lem is not that the patient was receiving drugs from multiple different
sources and the court must determine whether the physician’s prescribed
controlled substance caused the patient’s death, but is instead determining
which of the physician’s prescribed substances, if several were ingested,
caused the patient’s death.  Under a but-for standard, if multiple prescrip-
tions contributed to the patient’s death, it may not be medically possible to
prove that one was the but-for cause, and the “death results” enhancement
therefore cannot be applied.  Lessening the standard by adopting a contrib-
uting-factors test will permit application of the “death results” enhancement
of section 841(b) to a physician-caused patient death.  “[C]ourts, commenta-
tors, and law reform commissions alike have long recognized that a but-for
test is an unsound tool in certain circumstances, particularly when multiple
160 Barnes & Sklaver, supra note 45, at 103.
161 See Barnes & Arndt, supra note 52, at 282.
162 See id.
163 Courtwright, supra note 50, at 10.
164 Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 25.
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forces coincide or combine to produce a given result.”165  “A ‘contributing
cause’ test makes particularly good sense under the ‘death results’ provision
because many drug-overdose deaths—such as Banka’s death [in Burrage]—
are paradigmatic cases of concurrent causation: drug users often use drugs in
combination, and drugs in combination can be especially lethal.”166  Apply-
ing the “death results” provision to a drug overdose “gives particular reason
to think Congress intended a contributing-cause test,” as “[g]iven the preva-
lence of mixed-drug overdoses, it would be anomalous to conclude that the
‘death results’ provision is unconcerned with such deaths when no single
drug was a but-for . . . cause of the death.”167
It is not outside the realm of possibility for Congress to amend the lan-
guage of section 841.  In fact, section 841(b)(1) has been amended six times
since its enactment.168  Both counsel for petitioner in Burrage and the
Supreme Court noted that Congress had the option of amending the lan-
guage in the CSA to reflect the government’s proposed interpretation.  Fur-
ther, the statute does not require a but-for causation standard:
The text of the “death results” provision does not limit its reach by specifying
a particular test for causation in fact.  Nor do definitions of “result” contain
such a limitation. . . . [N]othing about the definition of “result” rules out the
commonsense idea that results may sometimes proceed from the contribu-
tions of many causes in the aggregate.  The text of the statute is thus fully
compatible with criminal law’s acceptance of the concept of contributing
cause.169
The administration has recognized the seriousness of the opioid epi-
demic and the role that prescription drugs play in it.  Prescription opioids
can only be obtained through a prescribing physician, which means that the
role that doctors play in the crisis must not be overlooked.  Currently, there
are several amendments pertaining to the CSA in both the House and the
Senate, including two that specifically address section 841(b) regarding
165 Id. at 13.
166 Id. at 13–14.
167 Id. at 28–29.
168 See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2, 4, 124 Stat. 2372,
2372–73 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960 (2012)); Ryan Haight Online Phar-
macy Consumer Protection Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-425, § 3, 122 Stat. 4820, 4821–34
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.); 21st Century Department
of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 3005, 116 Stat. 1758,
1805 (2002) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960); Hillory J. Farias and
Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-172, § 3, 114 Stat.
7, 8–9 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Methamphetamine Traf-
ficking Penalty Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. E, § 2, 112 Stat. 2681-
759, 2681-759 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960); Drug-Induced Rape Preven-
tion and Punishment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-305, § 2, 110 Stat. 3807, 3807 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).
169 Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 27–28 (citations omitted).
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fentanyl,170 a drug deemed to be highly dangerous and increasingly the
cause of opioid death.  As discussed in subsection III.B.2, such an amend-
ment will not create an overreach because prosecutorial discretion will still
permit prosecutors to decide which doctors to prosecute and whether to seek
the enhanced penalty.
During oral argument in Burrage, counsel for petitioner argued that the
government’s concerns “are already addressed in the criminal law, and we do
not need to change the criminal law of causation and relax it to encompass
more harms.”171  But requesting that Congress amend the relevant language
of the CSA will skirt the problem of “chang[ing] the criminal law.”172  Justice
Breyer expressed hesitation “to go backwards from the very vague and open
language” of “substantial versus contributing” and suggested leaving the sub-
stantial language to “let the lower courts figure it out, so we don’t confuse the
entire bar and the entire Congress.”173  But as counsel for petitioner deftly
stated:
Congress knows how to address a contributing cause standard.  They said it
in numerous other statutes that a certain act contributes to a death, that the
result is in whole or in part a result of the defendant’s action.  They’ve said
it.  They know how to say it and they could say it again in this statute if they
wanted to.174
This amendment of section 841 is aimed at instances where a doctor is
prescribing more than one prescription opioid to a patient and is doing so
for an illegitimate purpose outside the scope of professional conduct.  This
could include overprescribing the medication, filling the medication too
early, filling new medications with knowledge that the patient’s positive toxi-
cology screens do not match the drugs he is being prescribed, ignoring pleas
from the patient’s friends or neighbors that the patient is abusing the drugs
and continuing to prescribe, or continuing to prescribe opioids to a patient
even after the patient overdoses.  Counsel for petitioner told the Court that
the argument for a contributing-cause test “should be presented to Congress
to amend the statute to incorporate language that addresses that.”175  This
Note asks Congress to consider precisely that.
It is valid to raise the concern that this amendment, while crafted with a
physician-patient death scenario in mind and aimed at the prosecution of
physicians, will be applicable to all individuals who are prosecuted under sec-
tion 841.  However, the solution to the concerns raised here is not to create a
carve out for physicians.  Creating a carve out in the CSA specifically for phy-
sician conduct would not comport with Congress’s intent in drafting its lan-
guage and would increase existing tension between medical practitioners and
170 Help Ensure Lives are Protected Act of 2017, H.R. 3883, 115th Cong. (2017);
Mandatory Minimum Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 3800, 115th Cong. (2017).
171 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 57.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 47.
174 Id. at 16.
175 Id.
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federal drug enforcement efforts.  Such tension exists because “health care
practitioners see DEA interventions as a threat to their autonomy to practice
medicine in a way that best serves their patients.”176  Physicians are subject to
disciplinary action by the medical board that grants—and has the power to
remove—their licenses and to civil liability for medical malpractice, but fed-
eral criminal consequences for physician conduct are rarer,177 and Congress
would likely hesitate to create such an outcome here.
CONCLUSION
By revising the language of the CSA to permit for a contributing-factors
test, Congress will authorize punishment of physicians whose opioid prescrib-
ing practices are not only without a legitimate medical purpose and outside
the scope of professional practice, but also result in the death of the person
whom physicians take an oath to protect: the patient.  Such physician con-
duct furthers the opioid crisis instead of combating it.  While an amendment
to 21 U.S.C. § 841 is admittedly substantial and does not come without con-
cerns, it is time for Congress to take action with respect to the opioid epi-
demic.  In 2015, over sixty percent of drug overdose deaths involved an
opioid.178  In 2016, over 64,000 Americans died of drug overdoses—“a
higher death toll than all [American] military casualties in the Vietnam and
Iraq Wars combined.”179  New CDC guidelines that encourage physicians to
treat patients first with nonopioid medications and clinical regulations imple-
mented at the state level have helped, but only at the margins.180  Prescrip-
tion opioids account for nearly half of opioid-related deaths.181  Criminally
prosecuting physicians whose misconduct results in patient death will send a
necessary message.  Whether a congressional amendment to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) would help alleviate the effects of the crisis at least merits Con-
gress’s consideration.  A more ready avenue for steeply punishing individuals
like Dr. Dewey MacKay, whose sentence was reduced by 204 months post-
Burrage after his prescribing conduct killed a patient, should be made availa-
176 Barnes & Arndt, supra note 52, at 282.
177 From 1801 to 1981, there are only about fifteen reported appellate cases of prosecu-
tion of physicians for medical negligence.  James A. Filkins, “With No Evil Intent” The Crimi-
nal Prosecution of Physicians for Medical Negligence, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 472 (2001).  For a
proposal that tort liability is inadequate for pain management sanctions, see James R.
Blaufuss, Note, A Painful Catch-22: Why Tort Liability for Inadequate Pain Management Will
Make for Bad Medicine, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1093, 1117–20 (2005).
178 See Gery P. Guy Jr. et al., Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the United States,
2006–2015, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 697, 697 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/volumes/66/wr/pdfs/mm6626.pdf.
179 German Lopez, The Opioid Epidemic, Explained, VOX (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/3/16079772/opioid-epidemic-drug-overdoses.
180 Maggie Fox, Opioid Prescriptions Are Down but Not Enough, CDC Finds, NBC NEWS (July
6, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/opioid-prescrip-
tions-are-down-not-enough-cdc-finds-n780041.
181 In 2015, approximately half of opioid-related deaths involved a prescription opioid.
See Guy et al., supra note 179, at 697.
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ble for prosecutors who are able to present the requisite evidence.  A con-
gressional amendment of the CSA to clarify its “death results” language will
accomplish this.
